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Australia is the world's driest continent and the intensity of conflict over water and water 
management has been increasing, especially in rural areas.  By focussing on the recent federalist 
compact, National Water Initiative (NWI), we explore the use of market and property rights instruments 
in water governance in Australia.  The question we explore is does the use of such market-based 
governance instruments imply a reduced role for the state, as new instruments displace previous top down 
or regulatory modes of governance?  It is true that progress has been made in establishing a new 
property rights and market regime for water and that the operation of such markets has improved the 
technical efficiency of water usage. However, this paper challenges the view that the new market-based 
system of governance can be self-managing and thus obviate the need for substantial government 






Since the 1970s, there has been a perception that traditional forms of hierarchical government are 
being partly displaced, by market and/or by network modes of governance; a trend that reflects what some 
scholars see as the ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes 1997; Pierre and Peters 2000).  The environmental 
policy arena has witnessed the rise of new policy instruments and governance arrangements, especially the 
use of markets and property rights instruments, as well as a variety of network and stakeholder forms of 
engagement (Golub 1998; Jordan et al. 2005). The concept of governance has a wide range of definitions, 
but here we simply define it as the tools and strategies which governments use to help govern. In some 2 
cases this will involve traditional ‘top down’ modes of regulation and control. But a wide range of new 
stakeholder and network modes of governance are also being explored, and the use of markets and property 
rights, as forms of governance, have also expanded in recent decades (Pierre and Peters 2000).  
 
In  the  case  at  hand  we  explore  the  use  of  market  and  property  rights  instruments  in  water 
governance  in  Australia.    In  the face  of  serious  water  shortages  and  growing  environmental  problems, 
Australian  governments,  working  through  the  Council  of  Australian  Governments  (COAG),  have 
undertaken or proposed a range of reforms, the most recent of which have been embodied in the National 
Water  Initiative  (NWI),  a  reform  program featuring  market  instruments.    The  question  we  pose  is  do 
market-based  governance  instruments  imply  a  reduced  role  for  the  state,  as  new  instruments  displace 
previous top down or regulatory modes of governance?  
 
We  invoke  the  concept  of  ‘metagovernance’,  or  the  government  of  governance,  as  vital  to 
understanding the role of government in establishing, supporting and governing new forms of governance. 
It is often argued that markets or networks constitute new ‘self-organising’ forms of governance (Rhodes 
1997). On a similar note, ‘there is a strong impression conveyed by the NWI that it will create a largely 
self-managing water management regime through its use of market instruments’ (Connell et al. 2005: 57). 
It is true that progress has been made in establishing a new property rights and market regime for water and 
that the operation of such markets has improved the technical efficiency of water usage. However, this paper 
challenges the view that the new market-based system of governance can be self-managing and thus obviate 
the need for substantial government involvement. In other words, we argue that the market regime requires 
substantial metagovernance. 
 
We argue this for two main reasons. First, tasks such as the establishment of water markets and 
the new property rights regime, not to mention their ongoing functioning amidst high transaction costs, 
will require substantial government involvement, adjudication and support. Second, the market governance 
regime  is  unlikely  to  substantially  improve  environmental  outcomes.  Thus far,  the  activation  of  water 
markets appears to have increased not decreased rural water usage. This suggests that any progress on the 
environmental front  will  continue  to  require a  very  substantial  role for  government.  The  environmental 
policy arena has traditionally been inherently regulatory in nature (Weale 1992), and this situation is not 
likely to substantially change in Australian water management. 
 
Governance and Metagovernance 
A theme of much of the governance literature has been an historical narrative about changing state 
capacities and state-society relations in western liberal democracies. Since the 1970s but especially in more 
recent  decades,  conservative  and  neoliberal  critiques  of  the  state  have  been  joined  by  themes  invoking 
globalisation and regionalism, all of which have argued that the state has become weakened, hollowed out 3 
or outmoded (Pierre and Peters 2000; Marinetto 2003). Issues such as the rise of social diversity, political 
cynicism and legitimacy issues, and societal demands for more inclusive forms of decision making have 
also been seen as new challenges to the centralised, hierarchical state (Kooiman 1993, 35; Mayntz 1998; 
Teisman  and  Klijn  2002;  Keating  2004).  Relatedly,  there  has  also  been  a  growing  recognition  of 
interdependencies between the public, private and community sectors, and, as a result of these challenges, 
governments  have  been  both  pressured and  somewhat  more  motivated  to  attempt  to  ‘offload’ functions 
either to markets or to various kinds of network or devolved governance arrangements. 
 
In such accounts, however, the role of the state tends to recede to an ambiguous or peripheral role, 
a problem also apparent in earlier pluralist and corporatist theorising (not to mention standard neoclassical 
theories  of  the  market).  Partly  in  response,  more recent  governance  literature  has  in  part challenged  the 
hollowing out thesis (Weiss 1998; Marinetto 2003; Kenworthy 1997; Bell 2005; Holliday 2000) and  has 
tentatively  sought  to  ‘bringing  government  back  in’,  especially  in  relation  to  discussions  about 
metagovernance. Metagovernance describes the role of the state in the oversight, coordination and perhaps 
the  resourcing  of  governance  arrangements.  As  Whitehead  (2003,  8)  argues,  ‘metagovernance… focuses 
explicitly  on  practices  and  procedures  that  secure  governmental  influence,  command  and control  within 
governance regimes’.  The concept of metagovernance also highlights that fact the government has prime 
carriage of the management of legitimacy and accountability issues in relation to governance arrangements, 
especially  since  it  is  governments  alone  (at  least  in  democracies)  that  carry  the  formal  mandate  of 
democratic legitimacy.  Metagovernance does not deny the existence of markets or networks, but maintains 
that they operate in the context of what is essentially a public-private partnership, ultimately overseen or 
managed by the government. As, Scharpf (1997) puts it,  these are systems which act ‘in the shadow of 
hierarchy’.  
 
Seeing  markets  from  this  perspective  also  transposes  governance  concepts  into  the  realm  of 
political economy. Water markets are not the spontaneous products of civil society, in which governments 
may  choose  to  intervene  or  not.  Rather,  water  markets  should  be  seen  as  a  form  of  public-private 
partnership, a governance system promoting private coordination and devolving important water use and 
adjustment  micro-decisions  to  users,  but  occurring  under  the  oversight  and  coordination  of  public 
authority.  This  conceptualisation  is far  removed from  the  notion  of  a  ‘self-regulating’  market.  Further, 
following Anderson (2003: 8), we can also see markets as ‘socially penetrative’ modes of governance that 
potentially help empower the state’s governing capacity in various ways  (see also Keating 2004). 
 
The  problem,  however,  is  that  despite  the  contributions  just  outlined,  the  theory  of 
metagovernance (not to mention its empirical exploration and testing) is underdeveloped.  Metagovernance 
is a relatively new concept in the political science literature (though see Scharpf 1994; Jessop 1997; 2002; 
Whitehead 2003). There is still no coherent understanding of the nature of metagovernance in relation to 
different modes of governance, nor much understanding of the political ramifications and costs associated 4 
with  metagovernance.  Nor  do  we  know  enough  about  the  political,  institutional  and  administrative 
requirements for effective  metagovernance;  although  hypothetically  various factors  suggest  themselves  in 
relation to the case at hand.  
 
First, metagovernance in this system will require efforts to deal with high levels of uncertainty, 
driven in part by highly variable hydrology and environmental conditions, but also by the uncertain nature 
and  potential  variability  of  property  ‘rights’  and  trading  conditions  in  the  water  sector.  Attempts  to 
ameliorate this problem, especially in relation to providing clear and transparent property rights and trading 
rules,  are  important  because  high  levels  of  uncertainly  will  inhibit  investment  and  farm  adjustment 
strategies aimed at water conservation. Second, the market and property rights regimes in question will not 
be costless to establish or operate and will inevitably involve high transaction costs, most of which will 
need to be managed by governments. Third, we argue that market governance arrangements are not likely 
to deliver appropriate environmental outcomes. If this is so, metagovernance arrangements will be required 
to steer the system towards the achievement of such environmental goals (probably via non-market means), 
as  well  as  deal  with  deal  with  definitional  and  operational  disputes  in  relation  to  the  achievement  of 
‘ecologically  sustainable  development’.    Fourth,  metagovernance  must  deal  with  the  burdens  of  risk 
sharing,  especially  in  relation  to  what  will  become  contentious  issues  of  adjustment  assistance  and 
compensation.  
 
Clearly,  these  governance  and  especially  metagovernance  issues  raise  difficult  political  and 
administrative challenges for governments and public officials. Below, we will investigate the specifics of 
these challenges in more detail and demonstrate the scale of the metagovernance challenges that lie ahead. 
We will also address Andersen’s (2004) hypotheses about whether this type of ‘socially penetrative rule’ 
via markets and new property rights regimes can help ‘enlarge state competencies’. 
 
Water Management Policy: The Key Initiatives 
For most of the 20
th century in Australia, and reflecting practices in other water scarce systems, 
such as California, rural water allocations and especially irrigation water were allocated through political or 
administrative procedures rather than markets.  In the face of growing environmental and water scarcity 
issues by the 1980s (DEH 2001b), the focus of water management turned from expansionary goals and 
large-scale  engineering  projects  to  economic  efficiency  and  environmental  concerns.  Reflecting  wider 
neoliberal public policy trends, the dominant response has been to rely on market-based approaches to such 
issues (Quiggin 1996). A similar trend has been evident internationally in relation to water management. 
The leader in this development has been Chile, where a system of private property rights was introduced in 
1980.  Easter,  Rosegrant  and  Dinar  (1999)  conclude  that  markets  have  produced  improvements  in  the 
efficiency  of  water  use,  but  stress  the  importance  of  transactions  costs,  and  the  need  for  government 5 
policies to keep such costs low.   
A major shift in contemporary Australian water management came with the signing of the 1994 Council of 
Australian  Governments  (COAG)  Strategic  Framework  on  Water  Reform  (DEH  2001a).  The  COAG 
framework  was an agreement  between  the federal and  State  governments  (the  latter  of which  have direct 
responsibility  for  water  management).    Central  to  this  was  the  establishment  of  a  system  of  tradable 
property rights for water (Brennan and Scoccimarro 1999). However, the reforms also included provisions 
for environmental water allocations and sought to establish principles of sustainable development in water 
management.   
 
The COAG agreement was followed up in 1997 by an upper limit on water extractions from the 
Murray-Darling system (Australia's largest river catchment); the so-called ‘Cap’ – which fixes water usage 
in  relevant  catchments  to  1993-94  usage  levels.  The  COAG  Framework was also  incorporated  into  the 
federal National Competition Policy (NCP) which provides individual States with monetary incentives to 
progress  water  reform  following  the  COAG  framework.  Subsequent  State  legislation  has  sought  to 
operationalise the adoption of market mechanisms and property rights regimes for water in order to promote 
water-use efficiency and to facilitate structural change. Catchment-based water planning arrangements have 
also been established to promote water planning processes in which stakeholders participate in the planning 
of water allocations between users and the environment (Bell and Park 2006; Ewing 2003; Connell et al. 
2006).  
 
In 2004 a new COAG agreement between the federal and State governments - the National Water 
Initiative (NWI) - extended earlier work and was aimed primarily at achieving greater uniformity across 
State  water  management  frameworks,  including  an  expansion  of  water  markets,  clearer  definitions  of 
property rights, a commitment to catchment-based water planning arrangements, the allocation of $500m of 
public funds for water recovery and increased environmental flow, and the establishment of a National Water 
Commission to help oversee the these changes. These initiatives have set a substantially new framework for 
water management in Australia.  The new property rights regime for water will encourage a water market 
and water  trading,  with  the  aim  of achieving  greater efficiency and economy  in  water  usage,  whilst  the 
combination  of  the  Cap  and  catchment-based  water  planning  regimes  will  work  to  claw  back  water  in 
overallocated (water available  under access rights  that  exceeds  environmental  sustainability)  or  overused 
(actual water usage exceeds environmental sustainability) river systems for environmental purposes.  
 
Establishing a Property Rights Regime 
The  changes  in  question  parallel  the  type  of  property  rights  regime  increasingly  used  in  the 
management  of  common  pool  resources,  such  as  the  atmosphere,  fisheries  or  water  resources.  This 
commonly involves establishing an environmental limit on total resource usage and a system of tradable 
rights and a market in order to foster efficient, or at least cost-effective, allocations within that limit.  Much 
of the analysis of property rights regimes focuses on the creation of private property rights, which are ideally 6 
seen as precisely defined, enforceable through civil law and fully tradeable. This view of private ownership 
as the appropriate response to common pool problems may be traced back to Scott (1955) and reached the 
peak of its influence in the 1970s with the rise of the (private) property rights school of economic analysis 
(Furubotn and Pejovich 1974; see de Soto 2000 for a recent popularisation).  
 
However, as (Connell et al. 2005: 101) point out, the use of such instruments is inevitably part of 
a wider package of instruments and measures.  These typically  include an environmental  limit and other 
regulatory interventions, research, information sharing and community engagement measures, appeals and 
review procedures,  institutional oversight, and perhaps adjustment and compensation arrangements.  The 
arguments of Connell et al. may be related to the literature on common property institutions that developed 
in  response  to  the  arguments  of  the  private  property  rights  school  (Ostrom  1990,  Quiggin  1988). 
Beginning with  the observation  that  ‘common property’  was not, as assumed by writers  in  the private 
property rights school, a synonym for open access, writers on common property institutions showed that, 
under appropriate conditions, such institutions have provided effective management regimes for common 
pool resources. Quiggin (2001) argues that  management of complex river systems  inevitably  involves a 
mixture of private, common and state or public property. It follows that a complete analysis of property 




For  example,  an  aggregate  limit  on  extractions,  called  the  Cap,  was  established following  the 
1994  COAG  meeting,  coming  into  effect  in  1995.  The  Cap required  that,  on  average,  extractions from 
catchments should not exceed the level prevailing in 1994. The Cap was designed as an interim measure to 
halt  unsustainable  growth  in  extractions.    Following  this,  a  number  of  processes  were  put  in  place  to 
determine sustainable extraction levels for individual catchments and the Murray-Darling Basin as a whole. 
In  particular,  State  initiatives  have  sought  to  establish  catchment-based  water  planning  mechanisms 
involving  community  input.  These  processes,  a  form  of  network  governance  generated  significant 
difficulties and a range of metagovernance failures (Bell and Park 2006). 
 
Creating tradeable rights 
The  creation  of water  markets  across  different  State  jurisdictions  has required  major changes  to 
systems  of  water  rights  or  entitlements.  Traditionally,  water  rights  and  land  rights  in  Australia  were 
bundled together. The reforms outlined above have sought to separate water rights from land ownership and 
to enhance their security and tradability in order to support a market regime 
 
In the face of increasing environmental problems and growing uncertainty about the direction of 
policy, water users, rural communities and major credit institutions such as banks have lobbied for more 
secure and predicable system of entitlements. Governments especially at the State level were faced with the 7 
challenge of providing higher levels of security for water users while retaining the ability to adapt policy in 
the face of emerging knowledge of environmental need.  In NSW, for example, the Water Management Act 
2000  and  subsequent  Water  Management  Amendment  Act  2004  changed  the  nature  of  water  rights. 
Nevertheless, insofar as it conveys an analogy with freehold title to land, the notion of ‘property rights’ for 
water is misleading. A water right is a license, the terms of which depend on the operation of a complex 
and  variable  system  of resource  management,  involving  a  mixture  of administrative  intervention  by  the 
state and collective management by or on behalf of license-holders as a group. 
 
Under Australian state laws the Crown owns all water resources. With a higher value for water, the 
incentive  for  private  appropriation  has  increased,  threatening  to  undermine  existing  state-created 
entitlements.  Water  users  have  sought  to  capture flows  at  various  points  in  the  water  cycle,  including 
surface flows, groundwater and return flows from irrigation (Brennan and Scoccimarro 1999). In response, 
State ownership has been asserted ever more broadly, first by regulating private extractions from streams, 
then by controlling the use of dams to capture surface flows of water before they enter streams, and then by 
controlling access to and use of groundwater. The final step in this process has been the direct assertion of 
State ownership of rainwater, reflected in controls over the planting of trees in areas where runoff is needed 
to  fill  streams  and  storages.  In  this  context,  water  ‘rights’  do  not  constitute  ownership  but  rather  a 
tradeable  access  entitlement.  Their  existence  is  the  result  of  conscious  government  policy,  and  their 
survival depends on their success in promoting the achievement of public policy objectives.  
 
The  changes  under  discussion  have  also  seen  water  licenses  became  share-based  rather  than 
volumetric. Unlike licenses of the past, which entitled the holder to a fixed volume of water, contemporary 
licenses entitle the holder to a fixed (though variable) share of available water. The actual volume of water 
from  which  this  share  is  drawn  is  determined  by  government  and  can  vary  annually  in  the  context  of 
changing hydrology, seasonal conditions and catchment-based water management plans designed to allocate 
water  between  users and  the environment.  Secure water access  entitlements  (or  ‘rights’)  are  now  to  be 
defined as perpetual shares of a water resource as specified in a specific (usually catchment-based) water plan. 
By the end of 2006 all such water access rights and a record of water trading are to be recorded in publicly 
accessible water registers.  
 
            The  reforms  also  increased  the  duration  of  licenses.  Originally,  entitlements  were  extended  to 
fifteen  years  –  termed  a  ‘permanent  water  right’.  However,  water  users  protested  that  limited  period 
entitlements  would  not  provide  the  security  necessary  for  investment,  especially  in  relation  to  rural 
adjustment (Peters 2003).  In response, amendments to the NSW Water Management Amendment Act 2004 
extended licenses to perpetuity.  
 
A full market system ? 
 
It is generally agreed that the current NWI framework gives water users improved security and a 8 
more stable property rights framework in which to make investment and farm management decisions. These 
changes have laid  the foundations for the development of water markets and what will  inevitably be an 
evolving  property rights  regime.  The  changes  to  property rights  mean  that  water  licenses  have  become 
tradable assets which can, in principle, be bought, sold, leased or used as collateral.   
 
However, many of the markets that are required if these possibilities are to be realized are either 
thin or non-existent. Crase, O’Reilly and Dollery (2000) have argued that the permanent water trading in 
NSW is thin indeed, citing   resource control issues, uncertainty and transaction costs as important drivers 
of such an outcome.  More recently, Brooks and Harris (2005) conducted an analysis of the water markets 
in Victoria covered by Watermove, an internet based exchange for water rights, which facilitates trade in 
six Victorian water trading zones, clearing on a weekly basis (Watermove 2006). Brooks and Harris find 
that, for the majority of trading zones there is little trading activity. There are only three trading zones in 
which the markets for temporary water rights are reasonably active and liquid on a weekly basis, and none 
for which markets for permanent rights are liquid. 
  
              Finally,  though  licenses  may  be  more  secure  than  before,  State  ownership  of  water  remains 
unchanged.  While  comparable  powers  of  eminent  domain  exist  in  relation  to  land,  the  complex 
management issues associated with water mean that it is unlikely that either property rights in water, or 
trade in water markets will ever be as free of government  intervention as are ownership rights over, and 
markets in, land or personal property in general.   
 
Transaction Costs and the Operation of Markets  
 
Connell  et  al.  (2005:  101)  argue  that  a  property  rights-based  market  regime  may  or  may  not  be 
administratively simpler than a more traditional regulatory regime. It depends on the nature of the relevant 
transaction costs and associated requirements for regulatory intervention. In the case at hand,  transaction 
costs and the regulatory oversight is likely to be high.  
Transactions costs – general 
The standard micro-economic analysis of markets focuses on the case of markets where there are no 
transactions  costs.  In  practice,  all  market  transactions  generate  some  costs,  but  the  normal  operating 
assumption  of  micro-economic  analysis  is  that  these  costs  are  small  enough  to  be  disregarded.  Yet 
transactions costs are likely to be significant where markets are ‘thin’ (few buyers or sellers), where there is 
substantial  uncertainty  about  demand  or  supply,  or  where  the  good  or  service  being  traded  is  not 
homogeneous in quality. All of these conditions apply to markets for water licenses, in which licenses may 
be traded either temporarily (normally for a single year) or permanently. 
 
Transaction  costs  include  the costs  of:  obtaining  information; finding  other  traders;  negotiating 9 
mutually beneficial trades; effecting and registering these trades; and enforcing contracts (Williamson 1996;  
Rao 2002). With the current Watermove market for temporary trades of water in southern Australia, sellers 
pay a three per cent commission, and buyers pay a $55 flat fee plus a transfer fee of up to $112 for each 
transaction (Watermove, 2005). This direct cost represents only part of the transactions costs. 
   
The ability and right  to use water also depends on the transfer of water delivery rights and the 
acquisition  of  a  water  use  right.  In  most  cases  these  rights  involve  additional  transaction  costs  (ACIL 
Tasman 2003; Marsden Jacob and Associates 1999). Because of the geographical dispersion and potentially 
important disaggregated time dimensions of delivery rights, transaction costs are likely to be significant. 
   
Because  information  about  the  likely  availability  of  water  (both  allocations  for  irrigation  and 
natural  rainfall)  becomes  available  gradually  over  time,  decisions  to  buy  and  sell  water  are  subject  to 
considerable uncertainty. In an idealised market model, this uncertainty would be dealt with through a set 
of  markets  in  contingent  claims,  such  as  rainfall  futures.  In  practice,  these  markets  do  not  exist  and 
uncertainty gives rise to additional costs. Further, there are a number of government imposed restrictions 
on  transfers  across  regions  which  add  to  uncertainty  for  the  individual  and  to  transaction  costs.  The 
acquisition of use rights for new uses or users currently is subject to uncertain and often costly negotiation 
with authorities. In addition to the measurable costs noted so far, uncertainty about policy together with 
uncertainty in the minds of risk averse-traders as to whether allocated water can be purchased or sold on the 
spot market as required adds to transaction costs. 
 
Water may appear to be a fairly simple commodity. In reality, however, both the quality of water 
and  the  environmental  cost  of  withdrawing  it  from  one  location  and  delivering  it  to  another  differ 
substantially from place to place and time to time, so that each transaction is, to some extent, unique.  In 
particular, if irrigation is increased in areas of recharge to water tables, or areas where the soil contains high 
concentrations  of  salt,  negative  effects  on  other  parts  of  the  catchment  (externalities)  will  arise.  Hence, 
governments may either prohibit transactions that would have this effect or create a system of exchange rates 
with the effect that water applied in one location is more costly than water applied in another. 
 
Transactions costs with intercatchment trade 
If governments have made progress in establishing a property rights framework for water, some of the 
difficulties associated with actually managing market-based policy instruments are evident in debates over 
trade  between catchments.  The  simplistic  analysis  commonly  applied  to  the  creation  of  tradeable water 
rights, in which transactions between individuals are socially beneficial if they result in water being used 
where it is more highly valued, is unreliable in the case of trade between catchments. 
 
The first problem is that the environmental and social cost of water use differs between catchments. 
Some catchments are heavily over-allocated, in the sense that the amount of water allocated for irrigation 10 
exceeds the sustainable capacity of the catchment, while aggregate allocations in other areas are at or below 
the sustainable level. The object of policy should be to reduce water use in areas of excess allocation, for 
example by scaling back the volume associated with allocations in such areas. It is likely that, if aggregate 
allocations in a given catchment are reduced substantially, the market value of water in such catchments 
will  rise,  since  irrigators  have  made  investments  on  the  basis  of  the  previous,  larger  allocation.  Trade 
between catchments allows irrigators in such catchments to purchase rights from other catchments, thereby 
partially reversing the reduction in usage that was the goal of policy. This tendency might be offset by a 
(yet  to  be  established)  system  of  exchange  rates  between  catchments  (and  in  some  cases  between  areas 
within catchments) designed to reflect marginal rates of environmental damage.  
 
A related problem is that of ‘stranded assets’. If trade between catchments results in a reduction in 
water use for irrigation in a given catchment, the benefits generated by the irrigation infrastructure in that 
catchment decline correspondingly. However, the sunk capital cost of the infrastructure is unchanged, and 
costs of operation and maintenance are unlikely to decline proportionally with the reduction in water use for 
irrigation. The surplus assets are said to be ‘stranded’, since they can neither generate an adequate return on 
capital nor be moved to a better location (Freebairn and Quiggin 2005). 
 
A third problem pertaining to transfers of water rights between catchments is that, as the value of 
agricultural  output  declines  in  catchments  that  are  net  exporters  of  water  rights,  the  economy  of  the 
associated region will tend to contract, resulting in reduced demand for the services provided by country 
towns,  such  as  schools,  shops  and  banks.  Not  surprisingly,  there  has  been  strong  resistance  to  the 
development of a market for permanent transfers of water rights ((Freebairn and Quiggin 2005).  
 
Subtle details of the conditions under which such transfers  take place,  such as  the treatment of 
implicit contracts for the supply of infrastructure services, can have important implications for the social, 
economic  and  environmental  outcomes  of  trade  between  catchments.  These  details  will  not  emerge 
spontaneously from market processes, but arise from the governance of the trading system itself. Hence, the 
challenges for metagovernance will be enduring. 
 
Achieving Environmental Goals?   
The  original  COAG  documents  contained  an  explicit  expectation  that  the  creation  of  a  water 
market would lead to the more efficient allocation of water to high value-added users.  The expectation was 
that markets would create incentives for water-use efficiency, incentives for the development of water-saving 
technology,  as  well  as  driving  water  to  higher-value  users  and  promoting  structural  change  in  rural 
industries  (Beare,  Heaney  and  Mues  2003:  3;  Bari  2002:  9).  Moreover,  if  water  is  purchased  for  the 
environment,  a  water  market  would  also  allow  water  to  be  acquired  from  the  lowest  value  users, 
minimising the economic impact of strategies designed to increase environmental flows (Beare, Heaney and 
Mues 2003, 3). The COAG reforms were therefore accompanied by the view that more efficient water usage 11 
would help achieve environmental goals.  
 
Experience under the COAG reforms has seen a shift in water usage to higher value added users. In 
most  cases,  high-value  activities  are  more  water-intensive.  The  upshot  has  been  an  increase  in  water 
demand as water trading has expanded.  The period 1985 to 1996-97 saw a 76 per cent increase in water 
used for irrigation (Shadwick 2002: 11). The imposition of the Cap in 1995 brought an end to the rapid 
growth  in  extractions,  which  had  already  reached  unsustainable  levels  in  many  catchments.  However, 
continuing pressure for growth in extractions is reflected in the fact that the Cap has been exceeded on a 
number of occasions, particularly in regions that supply extensive irrigation areas. 
 
Also,  those holding  little used  ‘sleeper’ or  ‘dozer’ entitlements have come into  the  market as 
sellers.  Sleeper licences were water licences owned but not used, whilst dozer licences were only partially 
used. The most dramatic example is that of interstate trade. Young et al. (2000) note that in virtually all 
(99 per cent) of interstate water trades the water traded was not being used at its point of origin. Even in the 
favourable case where trade was ‘downstream’, the result must be to diminish flows downstream of the new 
point of use.  It has also been the case that those on-selling their water entitlements have been temporary 
traders  and  have  not  permanently  sold  their  water  entitlements.  This  is  partly  because  of  substantial 
uncertainty in the market. In addition, licences holders often wish to retain the rising capital value of their 
licenses.  Also,  as  Granovetter  (1985)  observes,  all  forms  of  economic  interaction  are  rooted  in  social 
relations and it is apparent in this case that farmers are not usually not keen on ‘structural adjustment’, 
especially if this means selling up and leaving the land or their communities.  
 
With  the  aggregate  availability  of  water  from  irrigation  systems  constrained  by  the  Cap,  the 
increased market value of water has led to growth in unmet demand. As a result, water users have pursued 
more intensive exploitation of flows at other points  in  the water cycle. One such response has been the 
capture of surface flows through farm dams, before these flows enter regulated river systems.  Another is 
greater use of groundwater extracted from the water table through bores. In both cases, the ultimate result is 
to reduce flows in river systems. Water managers have responded in turn and the capture of surface flows 
and groundwater has been increasingly tightly regulated (Environmental Protection Authority 2003).   
 
The  only  remaining  margin  for  capturing  additional  water  is  direct  exploitation  of  rainfall. 
Whereas rainfall has traditionally been treated as freely available to the owner of the land on which it falls, 
governments are now considering restrictions on the planting of trees and other water-intensive crops, with 
the  objective  of  maintaining  surface flows  into  catchments  and  recharge  of  groundwater.    The  issue  is 
complicated by the fact that recharge in areas where water tables are already high may contribute to dryland 
salinity (Bowmer 2006). 
  
Therefore increased efficiency has been achieved via the use of markets but key environmental goals 
have not been achieved. Meyer (2000) observes that  ‘The notion that improved water efficiency will free 12 
water  for  environmental  purposes  is  simplistic  and  will  not  work.  On  the  contrary,  the  demand  for 
irrigation use is likely to increase with water savings unless there is some explicit mechanism to encourage 
saved water to be reallocated’ (  
 
This is not a surprising outcome. Jevons (1865) observed the apparent paradox that an increase in 
the efficiency with which a resource is used may increase the demand for that resource. The ‘paradoxical’ 
outcome is consistent with neoclassical theory provided that the elasticity of substitution between factors of 
production  is  sufficiently  high.  Nevertheless,  it  surprised  Jevons  and  retains  its  capacity  to  surprise 
policymakers today. Given such outcomes. policymakers are learning not rely on markets to achieve the 
desired reduction in water consumption through the price mechanism.  
 
A related issue confronting water managers has been the creation of a water pricing regime which 
takes  the  full  costs  of  public  water  infrastructure  into  account.  Full  cost  recovery  of  public  water 
infrastructure through bulk water pricing is also expected to encourage low value added users to trade or 
lease their water entitlements to other more efficient users. IPART (2005: 14-15), the body responsible for 
water  pricing  in  NSW,  estimates  that  charges for  water  taken from  rivers  regulated  by  State  Water  are 
broadly  equal  to  the  level  required  for  full  cost  recovery,  but  that  charges  for  unregulated  rivers  and 
groundwater are well below the required level. These charges are to be increased at a rate of 10 per cent per 
year in excess of the inflation rate until full cost recovery is achieved. 
 
In recent years certain limited 'environmental' criteria have been feed into this process, for example, 
to reflect the costs of providing fish bypasses around weirs etc. A more recent issue that the Tribunal has 
been dealing with is the extent to which issues such as environmental flow for rivers should be factored into 
base water pricing, hence passing on the costs involved in such an initiative directly to water uses via base 
water prices. In a recent report on bulk water pricing, IPART (2005) argued against a substantial extension 
of the use of environmental criteria (eg. environmental flow) into it base water pricing arrangements, mainly 
because of scepticism about the efficacy of using pricing instruments to substantially change water usage 
practices. 
 
Water  prices,  are  not  high  enough  to  encourage  substantial  changes  in  farm  practice  or  rural 
industry adjustment of the type that would lead to significant reductions in water usage or to an increase in 
environmental flow  in  rivers.  The  risk  is  that  water  consumption  is  too  inelastic  to  even  high  prices, 
especially  in  the  short-term  as  changes  in  farm  practices  and  land  use  can  only  take  place  over  time. 
Moreover, if governments were, through some other instrument, to set a higher price to achieve the desired 
reduction  in  water consumption,  they  would  be guessing  as  to  what  price was  necessary,  so  that  there 
might be a considerable period of trial and error with regulated markets.  
 
The  implication  is  that  any  moves  to  substantially  reduce  water  usage  and/or  to  increase 
environmental flow will need to occur via regulation and/or government water purchases in water markets; 13 
ie. via a metagovernance strategy. Whilst it is probably true that uncertainty and the possibility of trading 
water  leading  to  much  higher  prices  will  potentially  provide  an  inducement  to farmers  to  change  their 
practices and  to  use  their water  more efficiently,  there  is  no escaping  the  need for a  substantial  role for 
government to help achieve environmental goals. The major intervention thus far has been the Cap. But to 
make progress in reducing water usage in over stretched catchments further interventions are required.  
 
The major shift required will clearly be the need for public water purchases in markets as well as 
other public measures aimed at water reductions, both to help increase environmental flow.  One problem 
here was the failure to buy up sleeper and dozer licences before water prices began to rise substantially. It is 
estimated that in the Murray-Darling basin, these licenses amount to about 30 per cent of licensed water 
allocation. As mentioned above, the new water trading regime has activated these licences. They are being 
bought up, especially by irrigators, to try and maintain if not increase water consumption. According to 
Fullerton (2001: 152) ‘sleepers and dozers have caused at least as much chaos up and down the Murray-
Darling as the Cap, because their awakening simply winds back the amount of water available to existing 
licence holders. So much for  “increased efficiency” leading to less use of water …’.  COAG was warned 
early  on about  this  problem:  ‘Dormant  rights  should  be  substantially  reviewed  before  the creation  of a 
system of tradeable water entitlements’ (COAG 1994). In hindsight the licences should have been frozen or 
bought up cheaply and the water utilised as environmental flow. 
 
  The  main  option  at  present  is  to  use  public funds  to  buy  water or fund water  saving 
projects.    The  NWI  has  an  allocation  of  $500m for  water  recovery  and  increased  environmental  flow, 
including public water purchases for environmental purposes. At this stage, however, policymakers have 
shown a strong preference for engineering projects aimed at reducing water losses, and have been reluctant 
to consider purchasing water rights from irrigators. 
 
Although  some  individual  irrigators  would  doubtless  be  willing  sellers,  the  organizations 
representing them are, in most cases, strongly opposed to the idea, as are many organizations representing 
rural communities.  With  the exception of South Australia,  State and Commonwealth governments have 
rejected the idea. Yet, in the absence of repurchase, it seems likely that markets for permanent transfers will 
remain  thin,  and  that  policy  measures  designed  to  increase  the  technical  efficiency  of water  use will  be 




It has been widely recognised that a re-allocation of water resources from lower to higher value-
added users is needed to  improve the allocative efficiency of extractive water use, and that  market-based 
instruments are an appropriate tool for this purpose.  The use of market-based instruments has also been 
encouraged as an appropriate method of ensuring environmentally sustainable resource use.  However, it is 
important to distinguish these goals.  More efficient water use and shifting water usage to higher value-14 
added users is not necessarily compatible with the environmental goal of reducing aggregate water use in 
order to increase environmental flow. Indeed, it is has been argued that market trading and pricing will not 
deliver the desired environmental goals in this case; these goals appear to be beyond the reach of market 
instruments, at least as currently deployed.  In this respect, Andersen’s (2004) hypotheses about whether 
‘socially penetrative rule’ via markets or other modes of governance can help ‘enlarge state competencies’ 
has only been partly vindicated.  It is true that sharing decision making about water allocations between the 
private and public sectors under the banner of market-based governance is still potentially attractive in that 
it provides an alternative to a fully top down governance system and can hopefully utilise informed micro-
level decision making by users.  However, the limits of this mode of governance in this case have been 
demonstrated. 
 
This paper has also argued that the use of markets as a form of governance does not amount to a 
simple  off-loading  of  tasks  or  responsibilities  to  private  sector  actors.    The  use  of  market  instruments 
cannot  be  understood  simply  in  terms  of a  theory  of  markets  as autonomous  and  spontaneously-arising 
mechanisms for resource allocation.    Policies  implicitly  based  on  such  theories  have  produced  perverse 
outcomes in the past and will continue to do so.  Instead, the notion of markets as an active public-private 
partnership  needs  to  be  taken  seriously.    The  specific  requirements  for  public  involvement  and 
'metagovernance' will vary from case to case.  In this case the requirements of metagovernance are onerous 
indeed.  Connell et al. (2005: 86) argue that  ‘the economic and political transaction costs of Australian 
water management will remain high'.  More broadly, considerations of issues related to public goods (such 
as substantive environmental outcomes) and transaction costs and uncertainty underline the limitations of 
market-based instruments in this case and point to the requirements for substantial metagovernance and the 
challenges therein.   Thus far may substantial problems of establishing a property rights system for water 
have been tackled but issues such as achieving environmental goals or issues of compensation have only 
just begun to be tackled and promise daunting challenges ahead.   
 
The notion of markets or other forms of governance, including networks, as forms of public-private 
partnership also highlight  the limitations of some strands of current governance literature which seek to 
portray governance arrangements as 'self organising' or which seek to down play the role of government.  In 
the case at hand, most of the heavy lifting will need to done by government with markets and networks 
playing  at  best  a  supportive  role.    This  suggest  the  need  to  more  fully  integrate  research  into 
metagovernance  into  ongoing  governance  research.    Just  as  in  earlier  debates  about  pluralism  and 
corporatism, the current debates and research agendas in the governance arena require a clearly articulated 
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